



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 6

## UN Force Is in the Making

by William R. Frye

UNITED NATIONS—So gradually that many are not aware it is happening, the UN is obtaining what it has always needed—an army to help carry out its decisions.

The progress is frustratingly slow. But fundamental changes of this kind do not take place overnight in any human institution, let alone an international organization like the UN. People really should not have expected—although they can be forgiven for having hoped—that a UN army would spring into existence, full-blown, this year.

The 1958 UN General Assembly took no specific action to advance the project. When the efforts made behind the scenes to agree on a modest forward step failed, it was decided to do nothing in a parliamentary sense. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was left to go ahead with the authority he already had to sound out member states about setting aside portions of their armed forces for this purpose.

The lack of formal action was a disappointment to many. But few outside the UN realize how deep-seated is the opposition, how great are the misgivings—both political and financial, but especially financial—among

some of the factions of the General Assembly, including the Latin Americans, whose votes are always needed if the United States is to muster a two-thirds majority.

The UN's experience in Lebanon very nearly wrecked the whole idea of a permanent, stand-by police force. Too many delegates thought Lebanon and Jordan were precisely the kind of instances in which the UN should not intervene with armed force, even of the most modest kind.

Both Lebanon and Jordan, it was argued by critics, were cases in which an unpopular or shaky regime was appealing to the UN for help to keep itself in power. Had the UN answered such an appeal, it was felt, it might have had to shoot one faction of the Lebanese or Jordanian people on behalf of another faction—something a world peace organization, prohibited from interfering in the domestic affairs of member countries, scarcely could be expected to do.

This, of course, was not the whole story in Lebanon or Jordan. But rightly or wrongly, enough UN delegates thought it was the essence of the story to be frightened when the United States started urging a UN police

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force for Lebanon. If this was the kind of action a permanent police force might be used for, it would be best never to set one up, they argued.

Hammaraskjold—who has been strongly in favor of a UN force ever since the early days of the Suez crisis in 1956, when he was converted to it by former Foreign Secretary Lester B. Pearson of Canada—knew the tenor of sentiment in the Assembly.

### What Hammaraskjold Proposes

Like all skilled mountain climbers—a favorite hobby of his—he felt that a short step forward which can be taken, and firmly held, is better than a longer step attempted, from which one slips and falls back. So his report on a permanent UN army on October 15, 1958 proposed only what he hoped everyone except, of course, the Communists, who oppose it, could agree on. Hammaraskjold was so modest in his proposals and so clear about what he was not suggesting that at least one newspaper account of his report was headlined, "UN Head Opposes Stand-By Force." He did no such thing. He simply anticipated, and attempted—unsuccessfully, as it proved—to disarm, the opposition.

In order to help encourage contributions, Hammaraskjold explained broadly what kind of a force he envisaged. The men would be armed only for self-defense and would fire only if attacked. They would never take the offensive; they would never try to impose a solution on an unwilling government or a people in revolt against their rulers.

Self-defense only, he admitted, was a severe limitation. What he did not say was that, without such a limitation, no manpower would be forthcoming. Not only was there the Lebanese experience, but the UN had found out in 1950 when—at the United States' insistence—it tried to build a fighting army free of the veto that almost no member was willing to pledge any men to fight for the UN. Even the United States, which urged others to do so, refused to put so much as a company at the UN's disposal for the future without attaching so many strings that the "contribution" became meaningless.

Hammaraskjold went further to reassure the skeptical. Pointing to the experience of UNEF, the original UN Emergency Force in Egypt, which has been a success primarily because both Egypt and Israel wanted it to be one, Hammaraskjold said a permanent stand-by force of the future should plan to act with the consent of all countries immediately concerned. This "principle of consent" is a second major limitation on a UN army. It flows logically from the first principle—that the army should be equipped only for self-defense. An army so equipped could not fight its way into a country if it wanted to; it would have to await the country's consent.

An institution with these limitations would not be an "army" at all in the usual sense of the word; it would be more of a "peace force," to use President Eisenhower's phrase, than a "police force." This is not to say that it would not be useful. Sup-

pose the UN were to station a small force of Indians, Indonesians, Filipinos and Finns—even some Poles or Yugoslavs—with defensive small arms, on Quemoy and Matsu. How much more shelling would Red China be likely to do?

Such an idea, in point of fact, has occurred to UN diplomats and has been discussed in private here. The difficulty is that neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao Tse-tung is happy with the plan. In these circumstances it is hard to persuade India and Indonesia, not to mention Poland or Yugoslavia, to contribute troops.

The plan, however, would not be any more practical if the UN had a "fighting" army. It would scarcely be practicable for a UN army to try to fight its way onto Quemoy and Matsu against all-out Nationalist Chinese opposition. In short, Chiang's consent would, in any event, be necessary.

Thus it may be that, in the long run, the Hammaraskjold limitation may not be limitations at all. They may simply be realistic devices to secure from a doubtful and hesitant UN an important first step toward new and long-needed peace machinery. In the year to come, additional behind-the-scenes work will be done to strengthen Hammaraskjold's hand and, in particular, to find a formula for financing the force which would win over necessary Latin American votes in the Assembly.

Mr. Frye, a member of the staff of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1941, has been its United Nations correspondent for eight years.

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## Nuclear Tests and Surprise Attacks: Can They Be Stopped?

Nuclear weapons and missiles are the Damocles sword hanging over civilization's head. But what of the legendary hair that keeps the sword from falling—how strong, or frayed, is it? Both Moscow (plus its satellites) and Washington (plus its allies) are deeply worried over it.

That is why diplomats of East and West have been meeting in Geneva since October 31 to see what can be done about ending nuclear tests with their deadly fallout. Meanwhile, another group of East-West representatives gathered in Geneva on November 10 to explore the problems of preventing surprise nuclear attacks. The United States and the U.S.S.R. each are alarmed over the possibility that the other might stage a nuclear "Pearl Harbor." Neither expects an airtight warning system—but each wants a system that would give the victim the few minutes needed to touch off massive retaliation.

At the outset it should be clearly understood that whatever decisions come out of these two sets of Geneva talks—on stopping nuclear tests and on preventing surprise attacks—these talks will have little direct connection with actual disarmament. Any agreements on either subject would represent steps toward disarmament, but not disarmament itself. This topic remains stalled on dead center, as it has been for 12 years. The crux of the discussions for a test ban and a system to prevent surprise attacks is the same as for disarmament: Soviet insistence on paper promises and the West's insistence on enforceable controls.

Some progress can be reported on the banning of tests. Last summer technical experts from both sides of

the Iron Curtain agreed that a network of some 180 detection posts around the world should make it possible to police a nuclear-test ban.\* Now, however, the politicians must agree that what the scientists believe to be technically possible is also possible politically.

### Reluctance in Moscow

As of now the actions of the U.S.S.R. do not suggest that it is. The Russians have turned down a United States proposal for a year's test ban—to be continued if a workable inspection system is reached in the meantime. Moscow rejects this course, insisting that there must be a prior iron-clad commitment to stop tests in perpetuity before the conferees take up the question of how to police any agreement.

Why Moscow is dragging its feet is anyone's guess. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggests that the Kremlin, which months ago was loudest in demanding a test ban, now does not really want it. In his opinion, Moscow discovered during last summer's technical talks that it was considerably behind the West in nuclear-weapons development. Under the circumstances, he believes, it may insist on continuing tests until it catches up.

Whether this estimate is true or not—and not all informed Washington observers agree with Mr. Dulles—it does seem that a political agreement to ban nuclear tests acceptable to both sides is for the time being a mirage. But this does not mean that efforts to reach an agreement must

not go on. The pressure of world opinion, alarmed over the effects of continued testing, actual or potential, keeps the politicians talking.

But while the technicians agreed fairly readily last summer on how to police a test ban, there is no sign that the experts are going to find it equally easy to agree on a method of preventing surprise nuclear attacks. For the difference between a nuclear test and a nuclear attack is as great as that between night and day. A test is not immediately destructive. An attack can mean instant, total annihilation.

Moreover, it was not difficult for technicians to agree on how to identify nuclear tests. Both Moscow and Washington are old hands at the business, and each knows pretty well just how the other operates. This is not true of surprise attacks. The rapid advances in weaponeering, in earth satellites, in missiles, and the secrecy that surrounds these developments, mean that the experts in Geneva are negotiating largely from ignorance. The whole idea of zonal defenses against surprise attack has become more or less obsolete with the progress, range, destructiveness and precision of new weapons.

The means of heading off a possible surprise attack are also expanding. Today there are the old ways of radar, electronics, photography, ground teams. Tomorrow the great powers may have space platforms, high-flying satellites, and so on. Negotiations in Geneva are going to be difficult. One must not underestimate the immensity and the complexity of devising ways to deter surprise attacks.

NEAL STANFORD

\* See Vera Micheles Dean, "The IAEA Looks to New Role," FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, October 1, 1958.





## Russia's Economic Challenge

In the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN of November 15 it was pointed out that communism was being checked in hitherto vulnerable areas of Western Europe, notably Italy and France, not by force, but by political stabilization accompanied by economic and social reforms. This is heartening news to the democracies, most of which are located in the Western sector of the world.

Communism, however, remains a potent force in the underdeveloped areas of the non-Western world—Asia, Africa and the Middle East—as well as in Latin America. In those areas the impact of communism is due far less to ideological propaganda than to the economic challenge offered by the Soviet bloc—the challenge of Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, when he said to the Western democracies, “We will bury you.”

As Walter Lippmann said in the New York *Herald Tribune* on November 12 in his series of articles on the U.S.S.R.: “They are certain in their own minds that they will win the primacy of Asia and of Africa not by going to war but by avoiding a war that would ruin their economic achievements. . . .

“The Communists are expanding in Asia because they are demonstrating a way, at present the only obviously effective way, of raising quickly the power and the standard of living of a backward people.”

The Soviet economic challenge takes three principal forms: Russia's growth as an industrial power, particularly in the past decade; the aid the Soviet bloc is giving to selected underdeveloped countries; and Russia's role in world trade.

The economic growth of the Com-

munist nations, which in the past had been doubted by some Western leaders, is now generally acknowledged. Between 1950 and 1955, the economy of the U.S.S.R. grew at a rate of about 7 percent a year, as compared with 4 percent a year for the economy of the United States. More recently, Communist China, which was less developed to start with than the U.S.S.R., has been increasing its production at an even faster rate. In 1957 the entire Communist bloc produced goods and services worth a total of \$284 billion. In that same year the gross national product for the United States was \$434 billion, and for the entire non-Communist world, including the United States, \$876 billion.

Thus, while the non-Communist world is still producing three times as much as the Communist world in total value, the rapid growth rate of Communist countries is closing the gap. It should, of course, be borne in mind that the Communist economies are still “young” as compared with the developed industrial economies of the West, and that their rate of growth may decline as they achieve greater industrialization. Meanwhile, however, they are placing their chief emphasis on the building of heavy industry and on the modernization of agriculture to the neglect of consumer goods—although the 41st anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik revolution on November 7, 1958 indicated that the Russian leaders now plan to step up housing and to improve the output of consumer goods as well as food.

Commenting on Russian economic data for the first nine months of 1958, Harry Schwartz of *The New*

*York Times* stated that Soviet steel production this year will for the first time probably reach 60 million short tons, a gain of 4 million tons over 1957—and this during a period when United States steel production, which is potentially 140 million tons, had averaged about 75 million, owing to the recession. An equal or faster rate of increase was indicated for coal, petroleum and natural gas. The output of some durable goods also has been substantially increased during 1958, among them television receivers and household refrigerators. On November 5, addressing a seminar in New York of the American Management Association on the dangers and opportunities of Russian economic development, Mr. Schwartz predicted that if the “very ambitious” production goals Khrushchev has set for 1965 could be reached, “he will undoubtedly try by 1972 to reach industrial production levels well above American output to date.”

### The 'Ruble War'

The industrial growth of the Soviet bloc is causing increased concern to the West, not only because of the military implications of stepped-up productivity, but also because of the bloc's enhanced capacity for aid and trade. It must be assumed that, even if the Communists had never appeared in Russia, a country with Russia's rich and varied natural resources, and with a vigorous population which has demonstrated its ability to acquire modern technological skills, would have in any case become a great industrial power. Some Western critics of the U.S.S.R., in fact, have argued that such a devel-

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## Will Common Market Succeed?

by Jan Hasbrouck

Mr. Hasbrouck has been financial editor of the European Edition of the New York *Herald Tribune* since 1950 and author of "Toward One Europe," a twice-weekly column appearing in that paper.

On January 1, 1959 the six nations which form the bulk and core of Continental Europe will take the first concrete step toward the formation of an economic and customs union with the avowed aim of eventual political association. At that time Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg will cut their tariffs toward each other by 10 percent and will begin to whittle down the system of quotas, which has been an even stiffer barrier than tariffs to the free flow of goods and services between them.

Eventually, at the end of a carefully charted 12- to 15-year transition period which began on January 1, 1958, the European Economic Community, or the Common Market as it has come to be called, will be a reality, and goods will flow as freely from Naples to Antwerp as they do from Cleveland to Atlanta. Perhaps even more important for the long run will be the existence of a supranational central economic authority, backed by a European parliament, which will wield, by majority vote, some of the sovereignty the nations involved have hitherto guarded with such fierce jealousy.

### Outlook Is Good

It is often asked whether the Common Market is just another brave start destined to end in fiasco. A major depression or long-continued economic ailment in one of the partner countries could cripple the scheme, but given "normal times," and assuming that France will be able in a reasonable period to work out a partnership with Algeria,

the odds are at present for success.

The outlook is good this time simply because the alternative is so dreary. The vigor, enterprise and inventiveness of the nations of Western Europe, which have made the world what it is today, are far from being at an end. But these very qualities have made small economic units no longer viable for peoples who wish to make use of the best modern available techniques. The peoples of Europe want to maintain their position of equality, if not of leadership, and they have come to see that this is no longer possible if their historic divisions persist. Only continent-size groupings now have a chance of achieving great power status.

Americans, with generations of successful Federal experience and a coast-to-coast mentality, are apt to see in the Common Market more than is there, or will be there for some time. To be sure, a market comparable in size to that of the United States is being formed, and it will give scope for mass-production techniques. Labor and capital will move freely, but it will be a long time before the European economy has the standardization and fluidity of that of the United States. Two milleniums of history, not to mention half a dozen different languages, will not be wiped out in a generation. There is not even all-European TV, or a *Saturday Evening Post* or *Ladies Home Journal*, to create continent-wide uniformity of tastes. Diversity and variety—fortunately, in the opinion of most Europeans—will remain for a long time.

However, the continental market

will be there, and it stands about where the American market stood at the end of World War I. Purchasing power is approximately a third that of the present American market, but there is every reason to suppose, judging by postwar developments, that the economic revolution which took place in the United States in the past 40 years will take place in Europe in the next 40.

Europeans are moving off two wheels onto four at the rate of a million a year. The market for housing and household appliances is bottomless. And the steady rise in productivity in recent years makes it reasonable to suppose that all these new products can be paid for in the only real new money there is—increased output per man-hour. It is exactly in this connection that the Common Market will make itself felt—by providing the scope for more efficient production and distribution.

### Meaning for U.S.

What does all this mean for the United States?

1. Many Americans who have been exporting to Europe are likely to be hurt. The Common Market will set up a common tariff barrier against the outside world which will be the arithmetical average of the present tariffs of the six nations. This means that if an American has been selling in France, say, his tariff costs will remain the same while those of his German competitor will go steadily down. Also, larger and more efficient competitors are apt to spring up in Europe.

2. The American who has been

selling in Latin America or elsewhere may soon find a well-heeled, aggressive, efficient, Franco-German combine competing for the orders in that area. As the world's largest importer of raw materials, the EEC will be a powerful magnet for world trade and a determined exporter of finished goods in order to pay for what it needs.

3. The United States as a nation will acquire, in the Common Market group, a healthy, powerful ally which needs no handouts, and overall American sales will eventually benefit by the existence of a rich new market. Losses in terms of the export of consumers' goods will be offset by profitable sales of capital goods and raw materials, and by the export of capital itself. These are the reasons why it has been the consistent policy of the American government since the war to do everything possible to aid the formation of the Common Market.

The export of American capital is at the moment the most interesting and active feature of the Common Market and is apt to remain so for some time. The only way to beat the common external tariff wall, and to cash in on the great expansion which has already begun, would be to manufacture inside the Common Market. In this way the American manufacturer not only would have free access to the continental market and its associated African areas, he also would be in the often highly advantageous position of being a "French," "Dutch," or "German" exporter to established markets overseas.

American commercial attachés in Düsseldorf and The Hague are receiving a score of inquiries a week from American firms, many of them small, which wish to explore the possibilities of manufacturing overseas. American automobile manufac-

turers are talking of a European market of 4 million cars a year within a decade, and Chrysler has just joined General Motors and Ford inside the EEC so as not to miss the boat. Or take synthetic rubber: Europe's production until recently was negligible while consumption mounted steadily. In recent months, even weeks, several major plants, some of them with American participation, have been started or announced. This is just one of many new fields, wide open for American investors.

### What Will Americans Do?

The dilemma facing Americans is where and how to get started. A consensus seems to be emerging that, except for very large firms with wide overseas experience, it is best to team up, either on a control or participation basis, with an established manufacturer in Europe. In return for American capital and know-how the manufacturer will provide a knowledge of the industry in Europe, established outlets and facilities which will permit at least a token production to begin quickly.

Such deals are not difficult to find, for expansion capital is very hard to come by in Europe. Moreover, there are hundreds of European firms which see that unless they get some new capital, new techniques and new vigor they are going to be swamped by competitors in neighboring countries who have hitherto been held at bay by tariff walls.

Where to locate is another problem for American manufacturers. Holland, Belgium and small nations which fear they will be overrun by German industry, have made an all-out effort to attract American capital. They have each acquired something like 150 American participations in varying degrees or outright subsidiaries. These range from one of Europe's largest typewriter factories to

the maker of an antitrust preparation. Belgium and Holland offer an attractive climate of free enterprise, stable social conditions and a good geographical position. Holland also has the lowest wages in Northern Europe.

West Germany has a stable, expanding economy and a large home market pending the full operation of EEC. But its well-established industries, and the fact that the foreigner gets no special help there, have caused American manufacturers to prefer license arrangements and minority participations in that country. France has the advantages of a large internal market and a soft currency, and access to its African territories encourages exports. One fact which sounds trivial but appears to be a major consideration with many Americans is the desire to have their headquarters in Paris.

Italy has the lowest wages in Europe, but these are offset by the highest social security charges, a good deal of *dirigismo* (directed economy) and government competition, and a long haul to the heart of the market in the north. But industries which need large masses of workers and are ready to train them have found Italy satisfactory. In the south government aid is available, and proximity to Mediterranean shipping lanes may well appeal in some cases.

### Free Trade Area

Any consideration of the Common Market is incomplete without discussion of the Free Trade Area, now referred to, in a doubtless vain effort to palliate French opposition, as the European Economic Association. This is an attempt, sparked by Britain, to dovetail into the Common Market by means still highly controversial the other 11 members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, or at least the

other industrial nations of Europe.

The idea was broached, even before the Common Market came into force last January, by the British, who never really believed in Franco-German cooperation until they saw that it had happened. When they suddenly realized that the Common Market was actually going to come into existence they quickly began to hedge their postwar policy of a nation in Europe but not of it. Britain had played the leading role in the OEEC because it worked for the liberalization of trade on a rule of unanimity basis, which meant more trade for the British without any supranational entanglements. The Common Market, with its centralized institutions, eventual majority rule, common external tariff and obvious bent toward political unity, seemed to Britain incompatible with its obligations to the Commonwealth.

And then, suddenly, there was the Common Market, the world's most powerful trading group, wide open to domination by Britain's archrival, Germany. Britain's answer was the Free Trade Area proposal which sought to reduce internal tariffs throughout Europe while letting each nation fix its own tariff toward the outside world. There was also to be no harmonization of the costs of production through standardized social and fiscal policies such as the Common Market nations, particularly France, thought indispensable. Finally, Britain wanted to exclude agricultural products from the scheme.

The Free Trade Area was met with a stone wall of opposition in France and cries of dismay elsewhere. Britain is Continental Europe's largest market for agricultural products and, the chorus said, if the British wanted to sell their industrial goods on the Continent they had to reciprocate with favorable treatment of

the Continent's food exports. Moreover, it was said, Britain would benefit both ways through favored relations with the Commonwealth as well as the Common Market. American capital, it was argued, would, of course, flow only to Britain to reap both those benefits.

Since the early days of complete misunderstanding, both sides have tempered their position a great deal, and techniques of compromises are available. West Germany and the Benelux countries, nations which lean toward free trade and hanker after the rich British market, are trying to work something out, and even France does not wish to assume the onus of splitting economically a Europe which is allied geographically and militarily.

### Britain's Influence Shaken

The central fact which has emerged from discussions about the Free Trade Area, however, is that the six Common Market nations, while desiring to work out some form of economic association with the rest of Europe, are not ready to do so if it would jeopardize in any way the success of the Common Market. This was the clear sense of the Venice meeting on September 21. The political significance of the Common Market, which means a great deal to the war-weary French and German peoples, and the instinctive yearning of the weaker nations to be part of a powerful unit rather than helpless flotsam in a fluid world have astounded the most ardent Pan-Europeans and have come as a shock to the British. Britain's time-honored policy of divide and rule in Europe is over; and the British are faced with the nasty choice of deciding at long last whether they are Europeans or not.

The issues are so big and the basic solidarity of the West so strong that

at least a token form of association will doubtless be worked out. When the Common Market six reduce their tariffs by 10 percent on January 1, Britain, Scandinavia and Switzerland will probably go along in order to keep the door open. But this will only postpone the thorny decisions.

Robert Schuman, France's former foreign minister and father of the European Coal and Steel Community, pilot project of the Common Market, recently commented as follows about the Free Trade Area:

"I am one of those who feel that we should make a gesture of solidarity toward third countries. But this solidarity cannot go so far as to endanger the fundamental principles of the community. Without the many safeguard clauses provided in the treaty, our agricultural and industrial producers would never have dared to venture into this Common Market, and they presuppose the acceptance of discipline, rules, controls and sanctions."

Opinion in France is virtually unanimous in opposing the Free Trade Area under any name unless the conditions cited by M. Schuman are met by all.

British opinion is almost equally unanimous that Britain cannot submerge its identity in a grouping which would meet France's requirements. It will take time and statesmanship to break the deadlock. Meanwhile, however, the Common Market is no longer a dream, but a living reality.

READING SUGGESTIONS: *Britain and Europe* (London, the Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1957); English texts of EEC and Euratom treaties available from the Publications Department of the European Coal and Steel Community, Luxembourg; C. Grove Haines, "What Future for Europe?" *Headline Series*, No. 124. (New York, Foreign Policy Association, July-August 1957); C. Grove Haines, ed., *European Integration* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1957); and pamphlet studies issued by Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français, the Federation of British Industries, and OEEC.



## Spotlight

(Continued from page 44)

opment would have come more rapidly, and with far less drain on the human and material factors involved, if Russia had found it possible to escape communism. It is thus possible that, sooner or later, Russia, even under a non-Communist government, would have become a rival of the advanced Western nations, creating problems which did not exist in 1917.

The cold war, however, has sharpened this rivalry, and has increased the necessity for the West to devise effective countermeasures. Soviet activities in aid and trade are regarded by the West not as normal operations, but as strategic moves on the world's chessboard. Thus Russia's decision to make a 400 million ruble loan (\$100 million) to Egypt for building the High Aswan Dam, a long-cherished dream in Cairo, is viewed as an attempt by Moscow to win a strategic position on the Persian Gulf; and its 400 million ruble loan to Argentina for the development of oil resources is described as part of a long-term plan for penetration of Latin America.

### Soviet Aid

The "ruble war" has thus become a significant aspect of the cold war. The Soviet bloc is giving aid to about a dozen key countries, in the

underdeveloped areas, at low rates of interest, with repayment stretched over 12 years. This aid is usually concentrated on the construction of industrial enterprises—such as a steel mill in India, the High Aswan Dam or the proposed oil facilities in Argentina—and thus gives psychological, if not always economic, satisfaction to countries which, now at a level of development lower than that of Russia in 1917, hope to benefit by its technological experience.

Equally significant is the Soviet bloc's participation in world trade, which, according to critics of the U.S.S.R., is determined not by economic considerations, but by attempts to disrupt the economies of other countries—for example Russia's sale in 1958 of tin at prices lower than the world price, with unfavorable results on other producing countries, notably Bolivia and Malaya. However, C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, in a November 5 speech to the American Management Association, dismissed Russia's sales of tin, and also of aluminum, as distressing but temporary.

In the future, Mr. Dillon said, Russia is more likely to use such raw materials as grain and oil to pay for the machinery it wants from Western nations. He also predicted that the Soviet trade offensive in the underdeveloped countries would run

into difficulties, arguing that Russia has no great need of their commodities and does not actually want to make such countries economically viable. Other observers, however, contend that as Russia begins to improve living conditions, it will increasingly need to import commodities hitherto regarded as luxuries, such as coffee, cocoa, sugar, rice, and so on, as well as cotton, which it has been buying from Egypt, and that the countries which produce these commodities, of which there has recently been a world surplus, will continue to be interested in sales to the Soviet bloc unless they find new outlets in the Western world.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the first of two articles.)

## FPA Bookshelf

*Pakistan: A Political Study*, by Keith Callard. (New York, Macmillan; with the cooperation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958, \$6.00). A timely, well-written analysis of the political situation in a country once more in ferment, by a Canadian, associate professor of political science at McGill University, who bases his views on personal knowledge as well as extensive research.

*Strengthening the United Nations*. (New York, Harper, 1957, \$4.00). This is the tenth report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, composed of distinguished American citizens and headed by Arthur N. Holcombe of Harvard University as chairman. At a time when the United Nations is gaining increasing acceptance in the United States both as a forum for discussion and as an instrument for averting conflicts, the recommendations of the commission deserve careful study.

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